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THE PERVERSION OF SCIENCE IN
CRIMINAL AND PERSONNEL
INVESTIGATIONS*
FRED E. INBAU
A suspected dope peddler by the name of Rochin was about
to be arrested by California law enforcement officers. He threw
two capsules into his mouth and swallowed them. Believing that
the capsules contained narcotics, the officers took him to a hospital where they enlisted the aid of a physician in the use of a
"stomach pump" for the purpose of obtaining the capsules. Up
they came, and a subsequent laboratory test revealed their contents to be morphine.
Another triumph for science? Or was this a perversion of
science?
The physician in this case might attempt to justify his participation by saying that no real physical harm, but only temporary discomfort, could have resulted from the "stomach
pumping" operation; and that he assumed his actions to be legally proper since the request for his assistance came from responsible law enforcement officers. On their own behalf the
deputy sheriffs could say that the arrestee in this case was not
just an ordinary citizen, suspected of an ordinary type of criminal offense, but rather a criminal guilty of one of the most despicable of all crimes-dope peddling. They might also say that
they were not on an indiscriminate search for incriminating
evidence, since they had good reason to suspect Rochin of possessing dope and even saw him swallow the receptacles customarily used for concealing such contraband. The officers could
also add that they knew at the time of the stomach pumping
operation that the California courts had gone on record as approving the use of incriminating evidence regardless of the
manner in which it had been obtained. But these various considerations, however valid they may be, do not necessarily fur'Originally printed in 42J. GRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY& P.S. 128 (1952).
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nish a negative answer to the question of whether the Rochin
case stomach pumping episode represents a perversion of science. Back of all of this there is a rather abstract factor to consider-the instinctive public disapproval of overzealous
investigative procedures of this sort, even when used against our
most undesirable element. That feeling is reflected, as well as
perpetuated, in court decisions from time to time. Let us take a
look, therefore, at the outcome of the Rochin case, first in the
Califomia courts and then in the United States Supreme Court.
In California, as in about half of the states, evidence can be
used in court even though it was obtained by illegal means. Adhering to its precedents to this effect, the California trial court
in the Rochin case admitted the scientific evidence against the
accused, and he was convicted. The California appellate courts
sustained the trial court's decision, although not without dissents from some of the judges. When the case reached the
United States Supreme Court, however, the conviction was set
aside. The decision of the Court was unanimous.2
Despite the California appellate court's affirmance of Rochin's conviction, the appellate judges were very critical of the
investigative procedures employed. They accused the deputy
sheriffs and the doctor of being guilty of "unlawfully assaulting,
battering, torturing, and falsely imprisoning the defendant."
The suggestion was made that Rochin sue them for damages
and that the qualifications of the deputies and the doctor be reviewed by the appropriate authorities. One of the California
Supreme Court judges was sufficiently incensed to state that he
would request the California legislature to enact a law which
would prohibit the use of any evidence obtained in violation of
any law or constitutional privilege. In an extreme reaction of
this sort we can see very clearly what a damaging effect the conduct of the officers and the doctor in the Rochin case has already
had in California. Let us now survey the additional damage disclosed in the decision and in the written opinions of the United
States Supreme Court justices.
Up until the Rochin. case the United States Supreme Court
had held that it did not have the power to dictate to the state
'101 Cal. App. (2d) 140, 225 P. (2d) 1 (1950). The Supreme Court of California denied a
review of the case, butJustices Carter and Schauer of that court dissented from the order denying a hearing and each wrote vigorous dissenting opinions. See 225 P. 2d 913 (1951).
2342 U.S. 165 (1952).
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courts what they should or should not do with regard to illegally
seized evidence. The search and seizure doctrines of the state
courts and their self-incrimination problems were considered
beyond the scope of Federal review and control, because the
provisions in the U. S. Constitution respecting these matters
were viewed as restrictions upon the Federal government only
and therefore applicable exclusively to federal officers and federal courts. Only when state officers and state courts did something which deprived a person of life, liberty, or property
"without due process of law" would there be any interference by
the United States Supreme Court; then it could intervene because the 14th amendment provision to that effect applied directly to the states. For instance, the use of a coerced
confession has been considered a violation of due process which
warrants a Supreme Court reversal of a state case in which such
a confession is used as evidence. This, however, involves something basically dangerous, basically wrong-in fact and in principle. But the Supreme Court had held that the use by state
courts of illegally seized evidence was not sufficiently dangerous
or wrong as to be considered a violation of any basic right implicit in the meaning of "due process." 5 And the same view has
prevailed with regard to self-incrimination matters, so that a
state could, if it wished, require accused persons to submit to a
interrogation or to testify in cases in which they are on
judicial
6
trial.
If the Rochin case had been handled by the Supreme Court
in its traditional fashion, the chances are the California conviction would have remained undisturbed. But the excessively
abusive conduct toward Rochin apparently impelled the Supreme Court to pervert some of its own legal doctrines and established principles in an effort to reverse the conviction and
condemn the practices involved in that case. So what did the
Court say? It said that the action against Rochin by the officers
and their physician aid constituted a violation of due process-a
completely new line of reasoning to justify what the Supreme
'Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), and Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). See
Allen F. A. The WoyfCas: Search andSeizure, Federalismand The CivilLiberties,45 111. L. Rev. (1950).
'Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944). Also
see, upon the subject of confession admissibility generally: 40J. Criminal L. & Criminology 211
(1949).
'See note S.

'Palko v. Connecticut, supra note 3.
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Court considered a desirable result. One of the judges was sufficiently disturbed to say that he considered the forcible taking
of anything from within the body-a specimen of blood, for instance-as violative of a Federal right.
The decision in the Rochin case and the use of the "due process" clause to cover such a situation will serve as a stumbling
block to the future efforts of fair minded investigators, forensic
scientists, and prosecutors in cases in which incriminating evidence will be sought from accused persons in a reasonable
manner and in well warranted situations.
It is too late to repair the damages done by the Rochin case,
but it certainly can be used by law enforcement officers and by
forensic scientists as a lesson for their future guidance.
Rather than endanger the utility of a scientific test or technique, it is better to limit its application to situations not involving an invasion of a person's body against his will. However
morally justified the officers or scientists may feel in a particular
case involving an obviously guilty person, the adverse overall effect that may result from their conduct will endanger the future
usefulness of the test or technique in instances where its application is very appropriate in point of law as well as morality. By
way of illustration, then, it is advisable to avoid the extraction of
urine, breath, or blood from an unwilling subject, even though,
on the basis of currently existing state decisions, such a procedure is in fact legally permissible.7 Compulsory tests of this nature tend to discredit the scientific methods and evidence
generally, even when the test specimens have been obtained
from willing subjects.
Medical men and forensic scientists will do well to preserve
the integrity of their professional standards and maintain their
own self respect as men of science rather than comply with the
requests of overzealous investigators to participate in such a
venture as the stomach pumping procedure in the Rochin case.
Then, too, the law enforcement officers themselves should be
fully conscious of the public resentment toward the police profession and police methods generally which can result from
even a well intentioned effort to secure evidence under these
circumstances. Moreover, they should realize that reasonably
intelligent and trained investigators can usually persuade an ac' See Inbau, F. E., Self-Incimination: What Can An Accused Person be Compelled to Do? (1950) 78-
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cused person to consent to a test, even though it requires a relatively slight bodily invasion such as the extraction of a specimen
of blood from the arm. In any event, if the accused person is
unwilling to give up something from within his body it is better
to forego the procurement of the desired evidence in this particular case rather that incur the unfavorable consequences of
compulsory conduct. Different considerations are involved, of
course, as regards the taking of fingerprints or the examining of
the outside areas of an accused person's body. Compulsory investigative conduct will be tolerated in cases of that type both at
law and in the public mind.8 As regards things or fluids within
the body, however, compulsory conduct apparently will not be
considered acceptable.
Now for another illustration of the perversion of science
and the extensive wreckage which may follow in its wake. In this
instance the wave of indignation was generated in the United
States Senate.
On January 17, 1952, Senator Wayne Morse of Oregon
arose in the Senate to report a case involving the use of the liedetector technique in the testing of an applicant for a position
of trust in the Defense Department. What he found in that
case, and the impression he gained of the technique's use for
such screening purposes, led him to state, at the conclusion of
his address, that if the use of the technique as an employment
testing procedure was not abandoned by federal agencies, he
would introduce legislation to outlaw its use. As a matter of fact,
Senator Morse's disclosures and complaint in this case caused
the immediate abandonment of lie-detector applicant testing
within the Defense Department.
Although Senator Morse expressed his general disapproval
of the use of the lie-detector technique for federal employment
applicant testing, there was one aspect of the test in this particular case which seemed to be especially objectionable to him.9 It
is also the one feature of the case upon which this present discussion shall be centered. The lie-detector operator had used a
so-called "personal embarrassing question" as a control question. According to Senator Morse, the operator, who was working for a private agency furnishing the service to the Defense
Department on a contract basis, told the subject, toward the end
*Supra note 7 at pp. 9-52.
'98(7) Congressional Record 261-265 (Jan. 17,1952).
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of the test: "Now I wish to ask you a very, very personal quesdon," which was not actually asked since the purpose was considered served by the mere stimulating effect of the question
itself.
This "personal embarrassing question" feature of the liedetector technique as used by many examiners has not only
served to engender public resentment toward the technique,
but it actually is practically useless and scientifically unreliable
for control testing purposes. Incidentally, Senator Morse would
be shocked even more if this had been a case in which the operator had asked: "Have you ever gone down ...

on ........

X Street?", which represents some examiners' conception of a
control question.
If the "personal embarrassing question" (e.g. "Now I'm going to ask you a very personal question") were used merely to
ascertain whether a subject is a "responsive" person (one who is
capable of lie reactions) it might possess some merit. But many
examiners use it for control purposes. In other words they
evaluate the reaction or lack of response to a question pertaining to the larceny or other offense under investigation by the
way in which it compares with the recording made during the
asking of the "personal embarrassing" question. Except possibly
in a sex offense case, the reaction or lack or [sic] reaction to
this stimulus question is not only ordinarily insignificant for
control purposes, but it can also prove to be very misleading to
the examiner using it. The factors involved in the stimulating
effect of a "personal embarrassing question" are totally different
and unrelated to those pertaining to a question about the offense (larceny, etc.) under investigation. For control purpose
the operator might just as well set off a fire cracker as to ask a
"personal embarrassing question."
This practice of resorting to "personal embarrassing questions" ought to be discontinued. For testing a person's responsiveness and for control or guilt complex questions, there are
other inoffensive and far more reliable methods.
Considering the ever increasing difficulties being encountered by criminal investigators and also by employers and governmental agencies concerned with security problems, we
certainly need all the aids that science can offer. A continuance
of the excesses and abuses of the type we have been discussing"-in other words, the perversion of science-may ultimately
result in a complete rejection of the very tests and techniques
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most needed in the fight against crime and in our struggle for
security safeguards in government and industry.
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